Bug #4408


Net::SSH connections are subject to plaintext recovery due to lack of CTR mode

Added by micah (micah anderson) about 11 years ago. Updated over 9 years ago.

Third Party's Issue
Target version:
ruby -v:
this bug can reproduce at Ruby 1.8, too


It is my understanding that due to the current Ruby OpenSSL bindings, only the following ciphers modes are supported in Net:SSH:

Net::SSH supports the following ciphers:



I am not talking about the ciphers (aes, des, idea, etc.) here. A quick clarification for those who need it: AES, 3DES etc. are block ciphers, this means that they take a block of cleartext and a key and produce a block of ciphertext (and vice versa), but when you're dealing with streams of information, you have to figure out how to join these blocks together, and there are security tradeoffs in how you do it. So CBC is "cipher block chaining" mode, and CTR is "counter" mode. You will notice that the only block chaining modes supported are only CBC.

If you review the following: you will see that this attack can potentially allow an attacker to recover up to 32 bits of plaintext from an arbitrary block of ciphertext from a connection secured using the SSH protocol in the standard configuration.
In order to mitigate this vulnerabilty SSH can be setup to use CTR mode rather CBC mode. According to CPNI Vulnerability Advisory SSH:
The most straightforward solution is to use CTR mode instead of CBC mode, since this renders SSH resistant to the attack. An RFC already exists to standardise counter mode for use in SSH (RFC 4344).

Due to the limited number of cipher modes available, any system wishing to do Net::SSH (eg. capistrano operations) that has picked specific ciphers for local policy reasons that do not include CBC ciphers will result in a mysterious problem due to lack of agreed cipher modes, the only solution is to downgrade the available ciphers presented to those of what Ruby has available. This has come up a number of times on the Capistrano list (e.g.

It is my understanding that the fix requires tweaking of Ruby's OpenSSL bindings to provide these newer cipher modes. In a sufficiently modern TLS implementation, i'd argue that it's simply going to be more and more incompatible with clients and servers as stricter requirements become standard.

Actions #1

Updated by MartinBosslet (Martin Bosslet) about 11 years ago

The Cipher class uses the OpenSSL EVP API, but if you look in the file evp.h in all available OpenSSL versions (including >= 1.0.0) you will find this:

#if 0
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_ctr(void);

As soon as this is supported by OpenSSL itself, it will also be available in Ruby's Cipher support.


Actions #2

Updated by naruse (Yui NARUSE) almost 11 years ago

  • Status changed from Open to Assigned
  • Assignee set to nahi (Hiroshi Nakamura)

Updated by nahi (Hiroshi Nakamura) almost 11 years ago

  • Target version set to 2.0.0

Updated by MartinBosslet (Martin Bosslet) almost 10 years ago

I think we can close this? As of OpenSSL 1.0.1, OpenSSL::Cipher supports CTR modes.

Actions #5

Updated by nahi (Hiroshi Nakamura) over 9 years ago

  • Category set to ext
  • Status changed from Assigned to Third Party's Issue

Indeed. Closing this as TPI. Added CTR test at r37994 for making sure we can use CTR.


Also available in: Atom PDF